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PREFACE 
The rapid growth of sqientific research organizations 
in the United States has given rise to numerous relatively 
new problems in management. With all this increased activ-
ity, one finds a paradox. Research and Development (R and D) 
effort is vast. The dollars spent are staggering. The peo-
ple and skills involved are many. The problems of managing 
this effort are great. But management literature and re-
search on research is relatively sparse. 
Because of personal interests and the recognition of 
the need, the author began serious research into the area of 
Research and Development management in 1959. This resulted 
in a thesis written in partial fulfillment of requirements 
fpr a Master of Science degree at the University of Alabama 
in 1960. The thesis, entitled " A System for the Control of 
Research and Development Activities,'' analyzed in depth the 
process of management controls for a Research and Develop-
ment laboratory. Emphasis, however, was upon means of keep-
ing the Research and Development manager apprised of the 
progress and incurred costs of projects being conducted in 
the laboratory . This study was undertaken as a logical 
extension to probe in depth the more crucial management 
decisions of pro ject selection, evaluation, and the 
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a llocat i on of resources to them. 
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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
Man's discoveries about himself and the world around 
him, put into an orderly form, have created that vast struc-
ture of knowledge we now call "science and technology. '' His 
search for knowledge, and the means to use it for his own 
benefit, has occupied man from his very beginningo 
Within the past decade the modern enterprise called 
"Research and Development" has become foremost among the 
social, economic, and military affairs of our nationo The 
role of research and development in the advancement of all 
modern science and technology is fully accepted by society, 
but its full significance is just now being recognized. 
Economists have attempted, with some success to meas-
ure the relative importance of technological change in eco-
nomic growth -- only one dimension of the effects of rese 
and development, but certainly an important one. Tradi~ 
tionally, economists have attempted to explain increases 
output per worker by increases in the quantity of capital 
equipment used and by technological improvemento A study by 
Robert Solow (1), however, yielded the rather surprising 
conclusion that only thirteen per cent of the increase in 
1 
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output per worker in the United States between 1910 and 1950 
could be statistically explained by increases in capital 
equipment per worker. The work <Df Moses Abramovitz (2) 
yields similar results. Both authors are well aware of the 
great conceptual difficulties that underlie their analyses. 
Solow (1) stresses that even if the quantitative conclusions 
are accevted, improvement in the quality of labor, better 
allocati0n of resources, and many other factors must share 
with research and development the credit for the remaining 
eig~ty-seven per cent. But even a casual comparison of the 
goods on the market and the production techniques used to 
make them today, with the goods and techniques of fifty 
years ago, dramatically indicates the tremendous role that 
research and development has played in improving the present 
standard of living. 
The results of research and its applications (technol-
ogy) are taken for granted today. Scarcely anything done or 
anything used to make life longer, easier, or more comfort-
able is unaffected by it. Of all the forces shaping and 
reshaping life in America, none is more insistent and power-
ful than those that s:pring from research and development. 
The standard of living depends on research and development 
to find new ways of using resources available now and to 
find new products among the old materials. 
There are many authorities including two former 
Presidential science advisers, Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky 
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and Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner --· who believe continued emphasis 
on research and development is essential to the nation's 
economic health (3). 
"In the new era , 11 Wi esner points out , 11 we must support 
all the go od research available. If we don't, our economic 
growth is going to falter. 91 
Although man has exis t ed for about one million years, 
research and development as a source of economic change has 
existed for only some one hundred and fifty years. 
Bertrand Russell (4) has said: 
"When we consider how rec ently it has come to 
power, we find ourselves forced to believe that 
we are at the very beginning of its work in 
transforming human life." 
Considering the entirety of mankinds recorded history --
some 5000 years -- 90 per cent of our entire technological 
accomplishments have occurred in the last two per cent of 
the time span. Today, organized research and development 
could be considered a primary growth industry in the United 
States. 
1. Dollar outlays from all sources for research 
and development in 1965 may total $21 billion 
or 3. ~;0 of the estimated gross national prod-
uct. This is about eight times the level of 
14 years ago when research was less than one 
per cent of national output. 
2. Well over 500,000 scientists and engineers are 
engaged in research and development. This 
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represents more than a doubling in eight years, 
in contrast to a rise of only 11 per cent in 
total civilian employment (4). 
One has only to look at Figures 1 and 2 to see that 
expenditures will probably exceed $30 billion by 1970 or 
before and that the per cent of the gross national product 
being devoted to these activities is ever-increasing, to see 
the unfolding story (4)~ It is · quite · obvious · that the results 
of these expenditures have a great leverage upon the economy; 
they are a prime factor in the nation's defense; they affect 
the life of every citizen. But more importantly, the ever-
growing bill for research and development reaches directly 
into each person's pocketbook. 
It should also be recognized that scientific research 
and its products may even decide the political future of man. 
'·· 
Today, this Country finds itself locked in a life-or-death 
struggle with an antagonistic ideology that is dedicated to 
the destruction of the democratic and capitalistic way of 
life. The communist world is devoting much of i ts energies . 
to this conflict in an attempt to surpass the United States 
economically and scientificall y. 
The Engineering Manpower Commission has predicted that 
only 35,000 ~ngineering degrees will be granted in the 
U .S /A. in each of· thB next few· ,years as ·comp~ared to ··100.,000 
per year in t he Soviet Uni on . This Country cannot and should 
not attempt to compete by concentr ating on the mass educa-














































53 55 57 59 61 65 
Figure 2. Per Cent of Gross National Products Devot ed 
to Research and Development 
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must be done to insure the maximum utilization of the avail-
able technical manpower. Efficient management of research 
and development activities may well be the deciding factor 
in this race for supremacy in the Technical/Space Age. 
But is the Country getting maximum utilization of its 
available resources? In no field so much as that of re-
search and development is it so easy to make false starts, 
to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in misdirected 
effort. Research is costly. It can be wasteful of both 
talent and money. The National Science Foundation estimates 
current costs of $34,000 a year in equipment and salary to 
maintain a professional man engaged in research and develop-
ment. This represents an increase of 34% in the last four 
years ( 5). 
In addition, there is strong evidence to indicate that 
research and development activities are becoming less effi-
cient. A recent study by Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, Inc., 
(a management consulta.nt firm) o.f 120 large companies, indi-
cated that less than one-third of their research projects 
were considered even a partial success (5). 
"There is little evidence that research productivity is 
matching the increased input of funds and personnel," de-
clares Francis C. Brown, President of Schering Corporation, 
a Bloomfield, New Jersey drug manufacturer. Spending on 
pharmaceutical research and development increased threefold 
from 1955 through 1961, the industry's figures show. But, 
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discoveries of new pharmaceutical chemicals averaged only 45 
per year during that period, 1'1r. Brown observes; not much 
higher than the average of 37 per year in the preceding five 
years. 
"Even these statistics are misleading, " 1'1r. Brown adds, 
"because it was in the earlier period that the more impor-
tant therapeutic advances were made 11 (5). 
The prime importance of the management of Research and 
Development activities makes such management worthy of seri-
ous study and investigation. Management of research and 
development is described as "one of the great voids of 
industrial management" by the Financial Executives Founda-
tion, an organization of corporate officers now conducting 
a two-year study of the subject. 
The need for increased research to improve the utiliza-
tion of the Country's scientific and engineering resources and to 
understand the art of Research and Development management is 
increasingly apparent. This is the conclusion of a major 
report recently released by the White House on the utiliza-
tion of scientists and engineers in government, industry, 
and universities (6). 
The report, authorized by the late President Kennedy on 
the advice of his science adviser, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, is 
the result of a two-year study by a committee of twenty-five, 
headed by James R. Killion, Jr. of the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology. The study was conducted under sponsor-
ship of the National Academy of Sciences and financed by the 
8 
Ford Foundation. 
To improve the utilization of talent in science and 
engineering, the Commission called for systematic study of the 
art and science of research management. They urged that 
funds be provided for this purpose by industry, private 
foundations, and government. 
New methods of Research and Development management re-
quired may be no less significant and complex than the 
research itself. Management methods and organization are 
not end objectives in themselves, but wise and efficient 
management can harness an exploding technology and direct it 
to assure our national and economic survival, as well as ad-
vance human welfare in the world of tomorrow. 
The author undertook this investigation in an attempt 
to contribute to the understanding of the inherent problems 
in the management of Research and Development activities, 
and to see what operations research could do for technical 
management. The purpose was to see if this new management 
tool or approach could help Research and Development manage-
ment in their difficult task of decision making. 
The relative newness and the basic nature of research 
and development management is characterized by more uncer-
tainty than are most other parts of the management function. 
Because of this uncertainty it might seem that any attempt 
to utilize an analytical approach to solve some of its prob-
lems would be foolhardy. Yet, because the need is so great, 
this may indeed be one way of obtaining a major payoff or 
improvement even though it is a frontier for analysis and 
one filled with intangible factors. 
If this study can contribute to more thorough under-
standing of the problems associated with the management of 
research and development activities, and, in addition, sug-




SCOPE OF STUDY AND PROCEDURE UTILIZED 
Management Problem Areas Classified 
As an aid in discussing the scope of this investigation, 
the major problems confronting research and development man-
agement may be classified on the basis of (a) problem areas 
and (b) the type of management decision reg~ired. Any such 
classification must be artificial and arbitrary; neverthe-
less, the breakdown provides a useful approach. The problem 
areas are: 
1. Technical program 
2. Personnel 
3. Organization structure 
4. F-inancial 
5. Service and support activities 
6. Facilities. 
Types of management decisions required are: 
1. Determination of long-range objectives 
2. Determination of immediate objectives. 
3. Operati~g decisions and actions 
4. Evaluation of progress and results. 




in the management of research and development activities, 
dictated that the areas to be investigated be limited. 
After studying the over-all situation presented above, it 
was decided to limit emphasis to investigating the determi-
nation of long-range and immediate objectives of the tech-
nical program. 
Throughout the investigation, it is assumed that the 
over-all objectives, policies, and plans of the organization 
have been determined. This includes such things as general 
areas of investig~tion, amount of money to be devoted to 
research as well as the facilities and the number of per-
sonnel to be devoted to these activities. Emphasis will be 
placed on the determination of a methodology to follow in 
selecting what new projects to begin and which current 
projects to continue. 
Research and Development Defined 
The general term Research and Develppmen} -- like 
Truth -- cannot be defined in a manner that is universally 
acceptable. But, there is a fairly good agreement that it 
is the observation and study of the laws and phenomena of 
nature and/or the application of these findings to new 
devices, materials, or processes, or to the improvement of 
those which already exist (7). 
Attempts have been made in the past to break Research 
and Development into categories, such as pure, basic, funda-
mental, supporting, applied, development, and the like. 
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This is all right, so long as one keeps in mind that fuzzi-
ness and overlap are ever-present. It is perhaps more use-
ful to visualize research and development activities 
arranged in a spectrum (Figure 3) as suggested by J.B. 
Conant (8), with basic research at one end and process or 
product improvement at the other. 
It is neither possible, nor necessary, to draw a dis-
tinct line on this spectrum and say this is "Applied 
Research" and that is "Supporting Research. "·· However, since 
words must be used to communicate, the following general 
areas are defined: 
Basic Research: Investigation and study of the 
fundamental laws and phenomena of nature 
with no preconceived notions of their 
utility. 
Supporting Research: Investigation of certain 
fundamental laws and phenomena of nature 
with preconceived notions of their utility 
at some time in the future. 
AQplied Research: Pursuit of a planned program 
of investigation toward a practical objective. 
Development: Application of the present state of 
the art to the solution of a practical 
objective. 
This investigation was directed primarily towards the 
middle 75 per cent of the spectrum; i.e., in the general 
areas of supporting and applied research. Although most of 
13 
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Figure 4. ]'low of Technology 














the problems inherent in Research and Development management 
are applicable to the whole spectrum, the two extremes pre-
sent certain characteristics that require modified handling. 
These will be discussed later, 
How technology advances through the various stages of 
research, development, manufacturing, and sales is shown in 
Figure 4 (on the preceding page). 
Distribution of National Research Efforts 
Research and Development efforts in the United States 
are funded and performed by three distinct groups of 
organizations: 
1. Industry. 
2. Colleges, Universities, and other Non-Profit 
Institutions. 
3, Federal and State Governments. 
Each of these groups has different motives for being 
involved in Research and Development activities; yet, there 
is a broad overlap of interests and programs, It can be 
seen readily from Figure 5 that the Federal Government pro-
vides the bulk of the funds (70 per cent), but industry per-
forms approximately 72 per cent of the work ( 9). 
Because of the different motives for doing research, 
and the different value systems used for evaluating it by 
the different participants, it was necessary to further 
restrict this investigation to primary consideration of 
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Government. Since research managers of the Federal Govern-
ment must make the decisions on the spending of 70 per cent 
of the Research and Development dollars in the United States, 
this area offers the greatest potential for improved effi-
ciency and savings. Industrial research will be considered 
also, but to a more limited degree. 
Summary of Study Scope 
Our intensive search for knowledge and the means to 
employ it for the benefit of mankind, must be accompanied by 
a corresponding search for the principles underlying the 
efficient and effective management of Research and Develop-
ment activities. In the past, an organization may have 
devoted its research effort to finding new products and 
processes and improving or eliminating old ones. Today, it 
must continue to do this, but it must also seek out -
through planning and research on research decision problems-
improved information and methods for administering and con-
trolling its research program. Only by continually improving 
decision making procedures will management be able to offset 
rising costs, and be able to meet the competition from other 
organizations. The application of quantitative techniques 
and methodologies to the solution of some research and 
development management problems shows promise. 
The crucial research and development decision problems 
are embedded in the selection, evaluation and control of 
Research and Development projects. The success of the 
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research program, and perhaps of the organization, may turn 
on the way these decision problems are solved. It is to 
this area, decision making, that this s ~udy addresses itselL 
The study is directed toward developing a decision 
algorithm to assist the research manager to decide how to 
best allocate his available resources for optimizing his 
return or output. Major emphasis is placed on selection of 
new projects, evaluation of existing ones, and determining 
what level of effort to devote to each. Most of the study 
is directed toward the middle 75 per cent of the research 
and development spectrum, and fr om the viewpoint of a gov-
ernment organization. 
Procedure 
The procedure utilized in this investigation is the 
sequence of steps used to attack problems in the research 
laboratory; namely, (a) identification and definition of 
the problem, (b) isolation and description of the factors 
relevant to the problem, (c) determination of a possible 
solution, and (d) evaluation of the proposed solution by 
comparing results against available pertinent k~owledge 
about the actual system. Unlike many investigations of 
technical problems in the laboratory, it was not possible 
in this investigation to perform controlled experiments or 
to arrive at an indisputable solution. 
The procedure used was: First, an extensive 
literature survey was conducted to ascertain methods being 
utilized and to garner the latest thinking on the subject. 
O(_ Second, interviews were conducted with top management 
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personnel and project leaders to obtain their opinions as to 
(a) what constitutes a successful Research and Development 
project, (b) what factors are important to the success or 
failure of a Research and Development project, (c) which of 
these factors can be evaluated, and (d) current practices 
within their organizations. 
Third, based upon the foregoing, and the experience of 
the author, a system was designed to permit a. Research and 
Development manager to allocate resources among a number of 
projects in a nearly optimal manner. This system was then 
discussed with several persons actively engaged in the man-
agement of Research and Development activities. Next, the 
system was modified to incorporate certain of the sugges-
tions received. 
Fourth, the system was actually applied in four re-
search organizations to select and evaluate projects. The 
results were then evaluated against all available pertinent 
knowledge about the actual system and situation. This eval-
uation was done to determine the probable effectiveness and 
shortcomings of the system. 
CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Paradox of Research and Development 
In his Conflicts of Principles, Ao L. Lowell (10) 
describes the problem of ascertaining the true limits of 
what he calls "conjugate principles" -- a pair of principles 
which are mutually contradictory or inconsistent, yet each of 
which is partially, or under some conditions, wholly true. 
The Research and Development manager has a similar problem, 
except that instead of conflicting principles, he has ap-
parently conflicting facts of reality. The conjugate reali-
ties involved are essentially (a) the outcomes and required 
resources for individual research projects are unknown and 
unpredictable, and (b) management must commit its available 
sources so as to optimize the payoff. 
If management does not know for sure what the outcome 
of each project will be, how can it assure optimum utiliza-
tion of resources? Somehow, Research and Development man-
agement must integrate these conflicting realities and reach 
the necessary decisions. 
The problems of the Research and Development manager 
might be compared to the problem of the owner of a racing 
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stable who wants to win a race to be run ro.an;y years hence, 
on a track not yet built, among horses not yet born. To 
make matters worse, he must contemplate the possibility 
that, when the race is finally run, he may find that the 
rules have been changed, the track length altered, and 
horses replaced by greyhounds. 
Definition of the Problem 
20 
Every manager of an organization engaged in re.search 
and .development is faced with the same basic problem: how 
to obtain the maximum benefit from the available resources. 
In every Research and Development group, there are more 
desirable projects than resources available to pursue them. 
The resources of time, money, facilities, equipment, and -
most important - competent, creative manpower, are always 
limited. The apparently desirable projects upon which to 
expend them, are not. Thus\'! the Research and Development 
manager is faced continuously with a painful problem con-
sisting of three parts: 
(1) Have the projects which have the highest 
potential payoff or value been considered? 
(2) Of the projects thought of, which ones should 
resources be expended on? 
(3) How should the available resources be divided 
among these projects to obtain maximum benefit? 
The generation of ideas, their initial examination for 
feasibility, the choice of which to support and to what 
21 
degree, are critical to the over-all effectiveness of the 
program. The decisions resulting from these phases will 
allocate resources in a pattern that is costly to modify or 
reverse. When large efforts are involved and choices are 
mutually exclusive, these decisions may, in the short run, 
be irreversible. 
The manager of a Research and Development activity 
seeks to avoid two general types of error: (a) Failure to 
undertake "good" projects, and (b) undertaking "bad" proj-
ects. The reasons for the difficulty most Research and 
Development organizations have in avoiding these two types 
of error are inherent in the Research and Development 
process itself: 
1. The outcome of individual projects, programs, 
and of the whole Research and Development 
process is highly unpredictable. That is, for 
other than technologically trivial projects, 
project selection involves decision making 
under (at best) risk -- where probability 
distributions can be associated with outcomes 
or (at worst) uncertainty -- where such prob-
ability distributions are not available" 
2. The outcome of an individual project occurs 
with time lags of months or years, during which 
period some of the factors entering into the 
initial project selection decision (market 
demand, material price, competition, available 
supporting technology) may change significantly. 
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Particularly in those projects that entail specific 
objectives, time constraints, and limited funds, the point 
of greatest flexibility in resource allocation occurs in the 
project selection phase. In later phases , when work is 
already in progress, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
change direction or reallocate resources without great loss . 
Any system fo r the management of Research and Deve l op-
ment must provide in some way for project initiation, selec-
tion, evaluation, and periodic review. If the system is 
effective, it should result in a smooth flow of well-chosen 
projects whose statuses are updated and reviewed periodical-
ly. In other words, of all those considered, those that 
have the best expected payoff to the organizat i on within 
budget, manpower, and other limitations should receive the 
necessary Research and Development effort. 
Importance of Time 
The problem f aced by management is to develop a product 
or provide the knowledge and/or solution to a problem, 
desired by a customer, by a date dictated by maximum payoff 
with the minimum expendi t u r e of resources (men, money , and 
facilities). There should be a methodology which can be 
applied to a ny organization , whether commercial or govern-
mental, which wi ll assure the optimal use of resources t o 
provide this maximal payoff. 
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The key factor appears to be time. Try as one may to 
separate the time factor from the allocation of resources 
and the reaping of profits or payoff, the separation cannot 
be made. Technological decay (obsolescence) and environ-
mental decay (changing situation) and the present worth of 
future dollars further dictate the consideration of the time 
factor in evaluating costs and payoff. A part of the prob-
lem is that any project in a rapidly changing or competitive 
technology may be obsolescent by the time it is designed, 
developed, or the results ready for publication or 
dissemination. 
Before the influence of time upon value and costs is 
discussed further, it is important to consider briefly an-
other aspect of .the problem: probability of success. In 
any discussion of research and development, one hears much 
concerning the terms "state of the art," 11 degree of 
newness, " "risk or probability of successful conclusion. " 
It is the opinion of the author that misunderstanding of 
such terms has seriously retarded progressive and dynamic 
thinking in the solution of the evaluation and selection 
problem. 
Some contemplated projects are recognized as having 
v~ry little prior experience for guidance in exploration, 
design, production, or use. The "state of the art" is con-
sidered low and the "degree of newness," high. With such a 
project it is also likely that the "probability of successful 
24-
conclusion" is considered very low. What is really meant by 
such terminology? Is it not that there is insufficient 
knowledge, facts, and experience available to feel really 
confident about the future? Similar situations exist to a 
greater or lesser degree with all but the very simplest of 
developments. The truth is that all unknown facts and expe-
riences can be obtained at some cost from applied research, 
pilot plant lots, market analysis, and thorough testing. 
Any project (other than basic research) can be successful 
if management is willing to pay enough in dollars and 
manpower. 
Keeping in mind the meaning of the risk of being unsuc-
cessful, the discussion can return to the considerations of 
time and its influence upon value and cost. Consider first 
the relationship between value of the results of Research 
and Development projects versus time of project completiono 
The true value of a project is the value which would be 
attached to it if the total contribution it would make to-
wards the objective of the organization were known. Figure 
6 shows a typical plot of true value as a function of time. 
For a commercial concern, this may represent monthly reve-
nues to be derived from a new or improved product; for the 
military, deterrent value of a proposed weapon system; for 
the space agency, international prestige derived from ac-
complishing a certain mission. 
One can conceive of projects whose results are avail-
able too early" This is especially true of projects which 
(!) 
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result in a tangible product. Prior to point A, the n e ed 
for the results or the surrounding circumstances necessary 
for its use have not yet arisen. Should the results be 
available prior to point A, invested money, personnel time, 
facilities, etc., without a payoff represents a negative 
value. For example, Charles Babbage, the British mathemati-
cian, invented the basic principles of the digital computer 
around 1820-1830. He finally abandoned effort on it in 1842 
when he could derive no value from his brilliant conception 
because the technology of his day was incapable of utilizing 
it. It was not until the advances of the electronics indus-
try 100 years later provided appropriate technological cir-
cumstances that the true value of his concept achieved a 
positive value. It is probably a miss-statement to say that 
the project had negative value to humanity, but, from Mr. 
Babbage's viewpoint, that was the result. 
After point A, the value rises to some peak, as at B, 
after which the need declines or the product has become 
obsolete and superseded by later developments. 
The true value is usually not known at the time plan-
ners must make their decisions. They must proceed on the 
basis of estimates of value. It is characteristic of most 
planners that they initially underestimate the value of a 
project until they see the sudden rise sometime after point 
A. There, then, is a tendency to overestimate the peak true 
value and underestimate the rate of decline. In practice, 
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the estimates of the true value curve are sometimes in error 
by a factor of 10 or 100. Even though it is not usually 
possible to have accurate numerical values available for a 
curve, such as that in Figure 6 (page 25), it does focus 
attention on a basic parameter of the problem. 
The relationship of project duration and cost to com-
plete the project is shown in Figure 7. The curve assumes 
that the same total effort is utilized regardless of project 
duration. A crash program to obtain the results in the 
shortest possible time is always very costly . If a project 
is stretched out over too long a period, the total costs 
will again r i se as enthusiasm lags, personnel come or go, 
and momentum is lost. It should be noted that there is a 
minimum project duration below which the project cannot be 
accomplished. Costs increase exponentially and are prohibi-
tive as this lower bound is approached. Thus, the time to 
complete a given project can sometimes be reduced by the use 
of additional resources, but only up to a certain point. 
Unfortunately, true cost is as hard to accurately pin 
down quantitatively , as is true value. However, even gov-
ernment managers must somehow keep true cost in mind to 
achieve optimized output . 
Basic Factors 
There are undoubtedly many factors which contribute to, 
or influence, the value of Re search and Development activi-
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at least, one is but dimly aware of them. Yet, it is pos-
sible to identify the prime considerations which should 
affect project selection. The following come to mind 
immediately: 
Cost. Money, as discussed above, is one of the lim-
ited resources -- even for a government organi-
zation -- and is also a measure which everyone 
understands. Since cost consciousness perme-
ates the entire economic structure, there can 
be no question that cost does, and must, play a 
role in the planning of research and develop-
ment operations. Cost -- either initial invest-
ment or operating -- must be viewed as a 
significant factor in project selection. 
Manpower. Two aspects are involved here. First, 
the American people attach considerable value 
to human life -- particularly in the nasty 
business of war. Substantial expense will be 
incurred to minimize waste of life, whether of 
military personnel in war, or of astronauts in 
peaceful exploration of space. Thus, costs may 
be subordinated to the value of human life. 
Secondly, manpower is also a limited resource, 
especially highly trained, creative persons. 
In the face of such a limitation, conservation 
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of trained manpower for use only where critically 
needed is an important factor. 
Time. The importance of time has already been dis-
cussed in some detail earlier. But time has 
another significant aspect to some government 
organizations. The decisive results which may 
accompany the employment of a new military 
weapon against an enemy whose defense is inef-
fective against it, are well recognized. Also, 
to avert disaster, time can be crucial in the 
development of countermeasures, both in the 
military sphere, and in the area of public 
health and welfare. Even in the area of peace-
ful exploration of space, time has great signif-
icance. No prestige or propaganda advantage is 
accrued by those who are second. This fact was 
wel l demonstrated by the impact of the launching 
of Sputnik I. For these, and the reasons dis-
cussed earlier, time may overshadow both cost 
and manpower. 
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Need. This f actor is akin to time in the sense that 
need for an item becomes acute where limited time 
is available to get it. But need is meant here 
to be a strong motivation in its own right. Need 
is a concept di fferent from the first three. It 
is a measure of how badly somethi n g is wanted, 
for whatever reason; the others then measure the 
expense in men, time , and dollars required to 
have and use it. Need is satisfied, cost is 
incurred, so to speak. But the cost in me n , 
time, and dollars may indicate that the price 
is too high, that the need is overvalued. 
Thus, it is believed that need is a considera-
tion along with the other three. 
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Thus, these four factors appear to be the fundamental 
parts of any measure of effectiveness which may be applied 
to research and development operations. The relative 
weights to be assigned will change from one situation to 
another, but in almost every case one. factor will generally 
overshadow the others and, in a sense, become the predomi-
nant consideration. Thus, any methodology or system for 
selecting or evaluating projects, on the basis of only one 
of these factors, is not sufficient. 
In summary, the problem to which this study addresses 
itself can, therefore, be defined as one of devising a sys-
tem to aid the research and development manager in selecting 
the best potential projects to work on, and alloc ating his 
available resources appropriately to obtain maximum benefit 
or payoff, keeping in mind the influence of cost, manpower, 
time, and need. 
CHAPTER IV 
OTHER FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE PROBLEM 
The Dilemma of Evaluation 
Two aspects of the research and development activities 
make decision-making particularly difficult. The first, 
(already mentioned) is the uncertain outcome of individual 
projects - ranging from the question of the cost and time 
required for a project or program to be successful, to the 
question of whether it will prove out to be successful at 
all. Second is the difficulty, even after a project has 
been "successfully" completed, of telling just how success-
ful it has been, and how much of the success is due to the 
efforts of the research organization itself. 
The output of a research organization falls into two 
categories: 
1. The direct products -- information. This in-
cludes all of the new knowledge, formulations, 
patent applications, operating instructions, 
product specifications, advice, diagnosis of 
difficulties, service reports, and other in-
formation turned out in accordance with the 
objectives of the Research and Development 
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program. This is an intermediate step in the 
accomplishment of tangible results through 
research. 
2. The indirect products -- tangible results. 
Few research and development departments have 
the opportunity, directly, to bring about 
tangible results such as increased revenues, 
decreased costs, and increased profits. 
These ultimate results are brought about by 
other organization activities, supported by 
the information that is provided by the lab-
oratory. While the ultimate success of Re-
search and D.evelopment, thus, depends heavily 
on the quality and usefulness of the research-
ers' findings, it depends also on the ability 
and willingness of the rest of the organiza-
tion to apply the information supplied. 
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This situation leads to the dilemma that confronts many 
laboratories. While the direct product of the laboratory is 
information, what management is interested in evaluating is 
tangible results. However, it is difficult to attribute re-
sults to Research and Development on a logical and equitable 
basis because the information is applied by other activities. 
Having a potentially useful result, such as a new prod-
uct or new information from the Research and Development 
organization, does not assure the parent organization a pay-
off. The influences of the comptroller, production 
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engineering, manufacturing and marketing can still make or 
break the end results. The instances of very poor or margi-
nal products developing into tremendous financial successes 
because of brilliant exploitation are numerous and well-
known. So, too, are the instances of financial disaster of 
technically sound and brilliantly conceived products which 
have been poorly commercialized. 
Because technical success of the Research and Develop-
ment project does not guarantee commercial success, it 
appears to be exceedingly difficult -- and of questionable 
value -- for the Research and Development organization to 
make firm predictions of potential markets, estimated pro-
duction costs, etc., over which they will have no control. 
Achieving a Balanced Program 
Another aspect of the problem of project selection is 
that associated with achieving a balanced program. As would 
be expected, programs of all but the smallest research or-
ganizations are composed of projects of varying complexity. 
In very general terms, these may be classified as long- and 
short-term projects, depending on the length of time re-
quired for a reasonable obtainment of results. An arbitrary 
system of classifying projects according to duration found 
useful by the author is shown in Figure 8. 
Determining how much effort to put into the solution of 
present problem areas and how much on problems of the future 
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Figure 8. Projects Classified by Duration 
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di rector. An over-emphasis in e ither di r ection can be dis-
astrous. It makes little sense to concentrate op. solving 
day-to-day problems while . the parent organization is left 
hopelessly behind technologically. On the other hand, there 
is no point at all in solving tomorrow's problems if the 
parent organization should fail before tomorrow comes. 
In the business world, the re s e arch director knows that 
long-term projects are needed to develop the new products 
which insure the f uture health of the company. Because of 
their long-term nature, however, concrete results.are slow 
coming. A program made up of a preponderance of _su.ch proj-
ects may cause worker morale to suffer bec·ause of a lack of. 
concrete, continuous achievement. At the same time, top 
management may wonder if the research organization is pro-
ducing anythi ng of value to the company. 
Short-term proje~ts, on the other hand, hold out the 
promise of quick, virtually assured, success. They favor-
ably affec t t he morale of those assoc·iated wi t h t heir suc-
cess, and the research organization may soon be able to show 
top management an i mposing list of accomplishments. The 
danger of an imbalance in the direction of short-term work . 
is concealed i n the complacency which may overcome the com-
pany by v i rtue of a favorable competitive position with 
regard t o curr ent products alone . G. 0. Cragwall (11) ·, 
Director, Technical Services Department, Charles Pfizer and 
Company, Inc ., put it this way: 
Progress results in the appearance of :new products 
as well as in the improvement of old ones. A com~-
pany whose research program has been devoted to 
short-term projects may some day find that although 
its products are better and less expensive to pro-
duce than similar ones of other manufacturers, they 
are, unfortunately, being replaced by new products 
that have been developed by their competitors. 
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Almost all of the pressures are exerted in the direc-
tion of selecting short-term projects; i.e., the high 
probability of success, the securing of quick repults, the 
sense of achievement in completing a project., etc. If the 
research director does not consciously recognize this, and 
take action to assure a balanced program, his apparent sue-
cess may well be short-lived. 
The director of government research activities is faced 
with the identical problem. His problem, however, usually 
goes under the guise of development projects versus basic 
and applied research. If he concentrates his efforts on 
today's weapons, or spacecraft, he exposes his country to 
future disaster. He must not only build and improve today's 
deterrent force, or today's space vehicles, but he must also 
lay and expand the scientific base for the weapons or exp lo,-, 
rations of tomorrow. 
As in the industrial sphere, quick results can be 
achieved in short-term, relatively simple projects. It 
takes a man of courage and strong convictions to insist on 
a level of long..-term effort, even though that technical 
effort is necessarily denied to or diverted from short-term 
work. 
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Unique Problems of the Government Administrator 
There are other factors which make the selection of 
projects for a director of government research more diffi-
cult" First, the objectives of government research are not 
so distinct as are those in industry. The industrial lab-
oratory is a part of the economic order, and research must 
contribute in some way to the satisfaction of economic wants~ 
Such wants can be foreseen, by and large, and in some cases 
even be created. Research, then~ is directed toward an 
economic objective in industry. Research in the government, 
on the other hand, is pursued in the interest of the public 
welfare. Considerations of cost, time, reliability 9 perfor-
mance, national prestige, and a host of othersi enter. But, 
it is discouragingly hard to define the precise terms of the 
objective. 
Second, there appears to be no measure of research ef-
fectiveness quite so striking as the profit and loss state-
ment of the industrial enterprise. The driving force behind 
all industrial research is the financial condition of the 
company, be it reduced costs, higher quality products, or a 
new line of products to promote business survival. The 
profit motive is totally lacking in government research, 
even though the consequences of failure may be more serious 
than mere bankruptcy. 
An authority on management of research activities, R. N,, 
Anthony (12), notes that the spur of competition which 
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provides a stimulus to good performance in industrial 1abo-
ratories is not so effective as in government activity. 
The research and development work done in an 
industrial laboratory eventually has to meet 
the test of the market place. Although it is 
difficult to appraise the performance of any 
research organization, it is reasonably clear 
that if competitors frequently introduce bet-
ter products, or if they introduce new products 
more quickly, then the record of the research 
organization is not good. 
The government research organizations, on the other 
hand, has neither periodic nor continuous tests of its per-
formanceo Although national survival may depend on the 
results of its work, the ultimate test may come too lateo 
The outbreak of war or of an epidemic is a poor time to find 
out that the research program has been insufficient or inef= 
fective. Hence, the government administrator has no yard-
stick comparable to the competitive market for appraisal of 
his results. 
Lacking the economic or profit motive to aid him in 
planning and evaluating his program, he must look for other 
criteria. Criteria such as the public welfare or the public 
good are so abstract in nature that they are of little bene-
fit. What is in the public welfare: crash programs to 
develop new weapons systems in the shortest possible time, 
in case war comes tomorrow, or an orderly, lower cost, normal 
priority development which will help keep taxes lower~ the 
budget balanced, but take longer? Tell the military Research 
and Development administrator when war will break out~ and 
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the nature of that war -- then he can decide precisely what 
is in the public welfare. But who can give him that 
information? 
How can the government Research and Development admin-
istrator in the space exploration field determine the worth 
of national prestige? What criteria can he use to determine 
how much he is justified to spend to launch a certain satel-
lite in January versus one in July? How much is an increase 
in reliability from 0995 to .996 of a certain valve, which 
will be used on a manned vehicle, worth if it is assumed that 
measurements of this precision are possible? How much is 
enough? How much is too little? 
His only guide is the amount of resources available to 
him from the public, through their elected officials. But, 
within this broad guideline the possibilities are still very 
nearly infinite. 
A government Research and Development organization must 
go to Congress annually for money. The amount of financial 
support received varies with the economic outlook 9 the 
political outlook, the military outlook, the current popu-
larity of research and the general attitude of Congress. 
Thus, the government research administrator must expect 
fluctuating financial support for his research program. He 
must decide whether to begin any long-range project (taking 
more than one year) without assurance that it can be finan-
cially carried to a successful conclusion. Although this is 
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somewhat true of industrial organizations, there is e. :marked 
difference in degree. 
Other problems also make the government administrator's 
job more difficult, such ·as personnel policies, control from 
Washington, fiscal and accounting policiesi and procurement 
policies; but again, most of these are matters of degreeo 
None of these precludes the government administrator from 
doing a good job of conducting a worthwhile research pro-
gram, but they certainly do make it more difficult. 
Pressures for Continuation of 
Submarginal Projects 
Perhaps no other phase of research is more important -
and at the same time - more neglected, than its evaluation. 
And surely no problem is more vexing than that of deciding 
when to abandon a project. It is not enough for management 
to decide to start a Research and Development project; they 
must also decide whether to continue it. 
Clearly, elimination of a submarginal project is of 
little importance if resources are unlimited, but such con-
ditions seldom~ if ever, exist. It is, therefore, important 
not only to screen these ideas prior to committing them to 
the research program, but it is equally important to elimi-
nate submarginal projects at the earliest possible date. 
Only by doing so, can maximum results be obtained from the 
limited resources. 
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Very simply, submarginal projects are those that; i:Lhould 
be removed from the active Research and Development programo 
Such projects include: 
1. Those that are technically not feasible. They 
obviously appeared to be feasible once or they 
would not have been started. Subsequent inves-
tigation has since demonstrated their 
unfeasibility .. 
2. Those tha.t are technically feasible, but will 
cost more than they are worth, and the need is 
not vital. Early estimates of resource re-
quirements or potential payoff were much in 
error. 
3. Those that are technically feasible and would 
be worth more than their cost; but they are 
consuming critically needed resources which 
promise a much higher payoff if applied 
elsewhere. 
Most of the literature does not even consider this par= 
ticular problem, or else gives very cursory treatment of it. 
It is apparently assumed generally that if projects are 
carefully chosen, then the problem of eliminating the sub-
marginal ones is automatically solved. So long as manage-
ment is dependent on estimates and crystal balls, however, 
it will be faced with the problem of identifying and elimi-
nating submarginal projects. The reaction of project 
personnel to the deletion of II their" project must be pre-
dicted and given consideration. "Pressures" that tend to 
influence decisions must be clearly recognized and action 
taken to eliminate those that might result in biased deci-
sions. Therefore, it is important that one tries to iden-
tify and plan for as many of these pressures as possibleo 
First, cancellation of a project is frequently thought 
by higher authority to be evidence of poor original planning 
and initial preliminary study. The laboratory recognizes 
this and reacts to it, so that unless projects are obviously 
doomed to failure, there is a tendency to retain them in the 
hope that original plans can be fulfilled. 
Second, there are some pressures which originate within 
the laboratory itself. It is not unusual for project engi-
neers to become so interested in their projects that they 
fail to recognize the deficiencies of them. In addition, 
they usually feel a proprietary interest in the work. Any 
attempt by management to eliminate 11 their II proj ecr:; is likely 
to be taken personally and resisted. Sometimes, this feel-
ing can be so strong that it becomes a valid argument for 
retention of the project. If the project personnel are 
high-calrber, and are involved in other important work, re-
tention of their "pet" project may be a better alternative 
than the consequences of cancellation. It is also well 
known that a project engineer's driving interest in the 
project can sometimes result in success despite apparently 
overwhelming odds. 
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Third, in addition to the sincere project engir.Ge.t 3 
there may also be the not-so-sincere "empire builder II who 
resists any attempt to reduce the scope of his work, In 
such a case, management may find it necessary and desirable 
to eliminate both the project and the empire buildero 
Fourth, pressure to keep the project can come from in-
dividuals of higher ·authority. This pressure is generally 
not the result of action to further personal gain, but re-
sults because the office or individual has so strongly sup-
ported the project that there is a strong desire to see it 
completed. When a laboratory recognizes that there is such 
strong feeling for a project at higher levels in the organ-
ization, it will be quite hesitant to recommend elimination. 
This is particularly true since any evaluation of the proj-
ect's worth must be subjective, and, thus, hard to defend in 
the face of strong opposition from higher authorities. 
Fifth, is the pressure exerted upon the administrator 
due to a crowded and busy schedule? In almost any labora-
tory, there are always "hot projects 0u that demand immediate 
attention. Thus, the laboratory director and his staff are 
kept busy "putting out fires. " Matters requiring immediate 
attention are worked on, while project review and elimina-
tion of submarginal projects is postponed and put off into 
the future. Because of other pressures, the laboratory 
director wants to be doubly sure of himself before he cancels 
a project; he wants to probe the problem in depth, but does 
not feel he has the time. He keeps thinking perhaps next 
week will be better. 
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Finally, the most important factor which causes the 
laboratory to hesitate in deleting a project is the inherent 
difficulty of deciding just which projects are submarginal. 
Unfortunately, no one has yet been able to devise a test 
which will positively indicate submarg:inali ty. The ref ore, 
the decision must be made by subjective judgment and such 
decisions cannot always be right. In addition, because such 
judgments are opinion, they can always be challenged by any 
source that favors continuation of the project. There is 
also the recognition that mistakes in judgment can have far-
reaching effects which may not be apparent until it is too 
late. 
All of this makes the task of screening and eliminating 
projects very unattractive. It is much easier to let the 
projects continue until completed, so the worth of the proj-
ect can be more firmly determined. But, to do so 9 may prove 
in the long run disastrously wasteful of preci.ous resources. 
CHAPTER V 
CURRENT METHODS OF PROJECT SELECTION 
The Dichotomy of Current Methods 
Having briefly defined the problem and other relevant 
factors, it now appears appropriate to discuss prior studies 
and current methods employed in the evaluation and selection 
of projects. 
In reviewing the literature and current practices, no 
two perfectly identical systems were revealed. However, 
every system reported had been adapted from one of two com-
peting approaches. These approaches can be called the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. Each approach has 
its major advocates, who champion it vigorously in current 
literature. Each has supporters among progressive and suc-
cessful research administrators. 
The Quantitative Approach 
The quantitative technique typically seeks to evaluate 
a research program by use of a single mathematical formula. 
Theoretically, this formula discloses the maximum an organi.-
zation can profitably spend on a particular project. Formu-
las in use often include such factors as: 
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1. Profits from products created or improved 
through research. 
2. Savings from processes, methods or raw 
materials improved or discovered through 
research. 
3. Income from research -- derived royalties. 
4. Royalty payments to other organizations, 
eliminated by research. 
5. Profits attributable to research --
created good will. 
6. Investments in Research and Development 
programs. 
7. Investments required to bring research to 
commercial fruition. 
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The industrial manager works within a frame of refer-
ence defined by company policy. The company's field of 
interest obviously limits the scope of the research activityo 
Within the boupdaries established by company objectives, the 
most significant criterion for selecting a project is: What 
will it do for the company? Indeed, no research project 
would be undertaken if it were known in advance that the 
company would not benefit. Therefore, a major objective of 
industrial Research and Development policy is profit, and 
quantitative systems are attempts to obtain better apprais-
als of the profit potential of projects. 
Although most research executives and company managers 
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have had little success in applying mathematical formulas to 
the evaluation of Research and Development, many continue 
efforts to develop valid quantitative y ~rdsticks, such as a 
"profit-and-loss" function, or an "index-of-return" formula, 
or a "project value-to-cost" ratio. They use such formulas 
to decide, in advance~ whether a particular project is worth 
undertaking, as well as to appraise the general profit value 
of research projects after completion. Several methods re-
ported in the literature will be described. Note that this 
report of methods does not exhaust the variety of methods 
proposed and in use. It is merely illustrative -- not 
comprehensive. 
Most of the formulations suggested and used by industry 
for project selection are fairly simple, including terms for 
anticipated costs and returns and generally, but not always, 
a term for risk or probability of success. For example, one 
of the earliest reported in the literature used the index of 
return (I.R.): 
Value of a new project= 
Estimated I. R. x Probability 
of Success 
Estimated cost of research 
where the I.R. is computed as: 
I.R. = (the value of the process savings for 
one year+ 3 per cent of the sales 
value of new products each year for 
five years+ 2 per cent of the sales 
value of improved products each year 
for two years.) (13). 
Solomons Disman (14) reports a scheme in which expendi-
ture for a Research and Development project is thought of as 
an investmento Over a certain period of time, the income 
stream from the investment should return the original in-
vestment plus a profit. Thus: 
Investment+ (rate of return on the Research and· 
Development expenditure) x (Investment)= Income. 
For one year, this expression becomes: 
Investment (I+ r) = Income in one year 
Investment = Income for one year 1 + r 
where r = rate of return on Research and Develop-
ment expenditure. 
This equation is then used to determine the maximum 
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expenditure justified (MEJ) for a Research and Development 
project, given a rate of return expected from Research and 
Development effort and estimated net income from the product 
developed. 
This scheme further utilizes two risk factors, the risk 
of technical success (Rt) and risk of commercial success 
(Rc). Thus, the MEJ calculation for a project payoff over 
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return on Research and Development 
expenditure. 
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Another organization evaluates results by comparh1.g the 
five-year estimated revenue with the total estimated devel-
opment expense (15). Results are evaluated by these 
formulas: 
Return on investment New Earnings (after taxe§.2 = Total investment involved 
Payout 1. •. d _ _ Capital outlay on projects per o - N . ~, - ( ft t ) ew average ann:.J.c,l revenue a er axes 
The estimated return value of the research results are 
sometimes evaluated in terms of the present worth or dis-
counted net value (DNV) of the anticipated results (16). 
The determination of the present worth of a proposed project 
involves calculation of any tangible earnings or savings 
computed in terms of·the net return on capital investment, 
current interest rates, and capital recovery periods. Be-
cause the results are expressed as estimates, this refine-
ment is usually eliminated except where the projects are 
expected to run over several budget periods. One formula 
widely used for these calculations, the Hoskold transforma-
tion, is given as: 
where P = present worth of net income 
D = net income 
R! = average net return on capital investment 
in the enterprise. 
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R = current rate of interest 
n = capital recovery period in years. 
Aries and Happel (17) have proposed a different type of 
evaluation which establishes a measure of "venture profit" 
which is distinguished from the normal profit generally 
realized in the business. The profit on a given investment 
in research and plant after taxes is c:ompared with the same 
investment in going operations. Various research projects 
can then be compared on the basis of their anticipated 
extra return. 
Dean and Sengupta (18) proposed a variation of the 
II index of return" formula. Assuming that a project sue-
ceeds technically in the sense that a usable result will be 
derived, and assuming that the results are exploited or com-
mercialized, a measure of relative performance of any two 
projects is furnished by the ratio: 
1t = 
present value of future returns from 
the project 
present value of future efforts 
required for the project 
s 
= R O 
The ratio of n is referred to as the payoff function of a 
project. The returns and efforts are measured in dollars. 
If the rates of return and of spending are continuous func-
tions of time, this ratio can be expressed as: 
1t = s = R 
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where:. 
t = time in years since the inception of the 
project 
s(t) ;::: rate of return (either sales, or cost-
savings or incremental sales) at time t 
r(t) = rate of spending on the project at time t 
p = a discount factor which the firm can choose 
at will. 
A . d f th . th . t . t . d. t th n in ex ni~ or e i proJec in a se in ica es e 
expected dollars' worth of future sales per dollar's worth 
of futur~ expenditure on Research and Development. It is 
suggested by the authors that the uncertainty about the 
future status of competition and customer-acceptability can 
be introduced by choosing an appropriate level of the dis-
counting factor P. 
The foregoing examples. indicate the extent to which 
objectivity is being injected into the selection of indus-
trial research projects. Fortunately, industry has a power-
ful measure of value - the dollar - to which, in one form or 
another, their analyses lead. But, the business world rec-
ognizes the limitations of analyzing the dollar value of 
proposed research in the basic research area. Indeed, those 
companies using indices as a matter of policy in project 
selection permit a substantial amount of work in exploratory 
research before a project is subjected to evaluation. 
Despite continued progress and increasing interest, the sad 
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fact remains that a satisfactory quantitative approach has 
not yet been found or widely accepted in industry. When one 
moves to the governmental research sphere, the picture is 
even more disappointing. ~his is attributed to the lack of 
the profit motive and the difficulty of expressing value in 
terms of dollars. 
Sobelman (19) has derived a quantitative method of ap-
plication to the development of military weapons. His basic 
equation is: 
Z = pT - ct 
where: 
Z = product value 
p = average net profit/year 
T = useful life in years 
c = average development cost/year 
t = years of development. 
Thus, his objective equation for a series of m projects 
becomes: 
m 
Ma:x;imize Z = L (pi Ti - ci ti). 
i=l 
Since money is worth more now than later in long-term 
projects, Mr. Sobelman modiftes his equation. To discount 
all dollar values to a present-time.scale of reference, he 
multiplies dollar values by 1 + (1 + i)n where i is the rate 
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of interest and n is the year of occurrence. This formula 
can be used for periodic evaluation at different steps in a 
product development. 
If average development time t, and average useful life 
T, are known for a class of products, then projects having a 
shorter-than-average development ttme, or longer-than-
average market time, can be recognized and rewarded. 
Let 
T*-T+T(l-t/t) 
t* = t + t(l-T/T). 
Then, the revised formula is 
~ = pT* - ct* 
Although this scheme is proposed for use by government 
managers, immediate difficulties are encountered in trying 
to apply this concept to an actual situation. Since this 
equation is expres$ed in terms of dollars and time, one must 
be able to place a dollar value on such intangibles as human 
life, reliability, weight, psychological impact on the 
enemy, etc. Although it is possible to derive such numbers 
(as illustrated by Mr. Sobelman's (19) evaluation of the 
value of a soldier's life of $8,000), their meaningfulness 
and accuracy are open to grave doubts. 
The RAND Corporation under Air Force sponsorship has 
put much effort into trying to derive techniques for choosing 
among several different approaches to the development of a 
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specified weapon system. After spending three years of 
developing their techniques, they applied them to a number 
of completed projects. Their conclusion was that they would 
have been wrong more often using their derived technique 
than if they had tossed a coin to make the decisions. 
Great progress has been made, however, in ~he appli-
cation of Operations Research techniques to weapon cost-
effectiveneis analysis. Hatry (20), Klein and Meckling (21), 
and others have devised and demonstrated techniques for de-
ciding whether to go into mass production on a weapons sys-
tem or what mix of weapons systems optimizes the military 
commanders cost-effectiveness position. These techniques 
are effective, nowever, only after the weapon systems are 
far along the development path, or are of a minimal improve~ 
ment nature. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has 
also applied Cost-Benefit analysis in deciding which launch 
vehicles can most economically perform specifi ed missions. 
Again, however, success has been limited to comparisons be-
tween vehicles in an advanced stage of development . 
Quantitativists say that sound, objective formulas have 
two advantages. First, they present numerically the most 
accurate possible estimates of research costs and returns, 
which qualitativists -- in determining research appropria-
tions -- must compare informally anyway. Second, since 
dollar figures and ratios are easily understood, they help 
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persuade top management (who, in a big company, cannot pos-
sibly be familiar with the details of the research program) 
to give a proposed program the support it deserves. 
The Qualitative Approach 
The qualitative school, on the other hand, believes, as 
one executive put it, that "formulas can't be relied on to 
evaluate research." The qualitative school, therefore, pre-
fers to depend on admittedly subjective "broad composite 
management judgments," which it seeks to strengthen through 
non-mathematical procedures and devices. Its adherents say: 
"When you come to research and development, you 
can't answer any of the questions on the fore-
cast. You don't know when you are going to get 
the thing, whether it is going to work or not, 
and whether it ts ~oing to have any value 
whatever . . • . " (Charles Kettering ( 22), ex. 
G. M. Director of Research) 
Most of the procedures used by the qualitativists have 
much in common. Typically, a series of personal appraisals 
pyramids through the organization from bot tom to top. Each 
technical executive judges the work only of those groups and 
persons reporting directly to him, relying on subordinates 
to evaluate work at lower levels. 
Some evaluations are part of technical management's 
daily job. Others are made during formal, periodic, program 
reviews. Such a review usually is made each time a new re-
search budget is developed. Some companies review their 
projects on a regular periodic basis or at certain stages of 
progress. 
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Regardless when, or how often , these reviews are held, 
the process is usually stereotyped. The executive committee 
(a) reviews research progress during the period just past, 
(b) decides which proposed projects and programs to support, 
and (c) fixes the budget on the basis of this decision. 
Normally, all operating and functional groups are repre-
sented on this commi t tee. This repre sentation helps insure 
a balanced research program, to give every present and pro-
posed product line the long and short range support it needs 
to fulfill its objectives within the company's over-all 
operating plan. 
Many scientists and Research and Development adminis-
trators are deeply concerned about even this growing tend-
ency toward formalization of laboratory decision-making. 
They believe that such formalization will tend to stifle 
many desirable projects and that the intuitions of the re-
search worker (which cannot be neatly written down in a 
formal project proposal) are the best guide to the potential 
worth of a project. 
Mee's (24) comments are typical. 
The best person to decide what research work shall 
be done is the man who is doing the research. The 
next best is the head of the department. After 
that you leave the field of best persons and meet 
increasingly worse groups. The first of these is 
the research director who is probably wrong more 
than half of the time. Finally, there is a com~ 
mittee of company vice presidents which is wrong 
all of the time. 
This attitude is rapidly fading, however, as more and 
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more organizations recognize the need for management control 
of research and development. 
Limitations of Current Methods 
Considering first the quantitative approach, an analy-
sis of the literature regarding both industrial and govern-
mental Research and Development decisi on procedures, rapidly 
brings one to the heart of the problem: lack of reliable 
cost, time, performa nce, and utility estimates. No matter 
how sophisticated and mathematically correct the formulas 
and ratios utilized may be, the answers received will be no 
better than the input data. 
The findings of a group at the RAND Corporation studying 
military Research and Development projects bring this into 
clear focus (25). Cost estimates, based on paper design 
studies have tended to be highly unreli able. For example, 
estimates of production cost of missiles erred by factors 
ranging from 1.3 to 57.6, with a mean of 17.1. Slippage in 
availability-of-aircraft estimates ranged up to five years, 
with a mean of two years. Cost estimates of Research and 
Development costs for all systems studied missed by factors 
of five or more. 
Uncertainties are great even after a project has pro-
gressed to a point where investment in plant and equipment 
is called for. Carter and Williams (26), studying a number 
of British companies, found that even with a n attempt to 
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estimate project return, the correlation between ac tual re-
turn and estimated return was an extremely low factor of .13. 
Besides problems of getting valid estimates of perti-
nent parameters, no sound method exists for apportioning 
credit for a products profit between a company's research 
department and its other functional groups . And finally, 
research costs usually cannot be allocated among various 
projects, except subjectively and imprecisely. However, 
impressively mathematical they may look, formulas based on 
such figures provide answers no sounder and no more trust-
worthy than the personal judgments that underlie these 
figures. 
In the realm of government or university research, one 
is confronted with all of the above problems, plus several 
not faced by industry. As was discussed earlier, the Re-
search and Development manager in government cannot as 
easily tie his decisions to dollars and profits. In many, 
in fact in most cases, it is impossible to at t ach a dollar 
figure to the v alue of successful completion of a project. 
Dollar values ascribed to such factors as national prestige, 
human life, psychological impact, and others that government 
executives must deal with are meaningless -- or at best, of 
a highly questionable nature. For example, how would one 
assign a dollar value to a universal cure for cancer? What 
is the quantitative value of a major adv ance in knowledge or 
understanding? Methods proposed at present do not offer 
adequate tools for handling these problems. 
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On the other hand, the strictly qualitative approach is 
not entirely satisfactory either. Although it may help to 
spread the blame for poor decisions, it really does not ap-
preciably help the decision-maker. It does not provide the 
analytical structure he so sorely needs. 
True, formulas do not provide precise answers. But, 
some aspects of Research and Development are fairly well 
suited to quantification. Moreover, the mere calculation of 
quantitative values -- where they are appropriate forces 
managers to think about the research contribution in a con-
crete and orderly way. In other words, while evaluation of 
any Resear,ch and Development program requires many guali ta-
ti ve judgments, still, appropriate numerical data can be 
useful in appraising some of its aspects and in formalizing 
the entire evaluation process. 
CHAPTER VI 
A PROPOSED RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL 
System Components 
Discussion to this point has attempted to define the 
problem and ascertain the factors relevant to it. In addi-
tion, the methods currently used have been reviewed and 
found wanting. Now, to be constructive, a system designed 
by the author is proposed. 
Any system for the management of Research and Develop-
ment must somehow provide for project initiation, selection~ 
evaluation, determination of resource allocation and peri-
odic review. If the system is effective, it should result 
in a smooth flow of well-chosen projects, whose statuses are 
updated and reviewed periodically. The system should help 
insure that those projects that promise the best expected 
payoff to the organization are identified and selected for 
support. 
The process for accomplishing the above objective is 
essentially the same for all projects. A diagram of the key 
steps is shown in Figure 9. 
The first step is conception of the idea and explorator~ 











































from any source. Although some ideas do come f r om outside 
of the Research and Development organization -- sales , 
manufacturing or service personnel, etc. -- most do not . 
Experience in most organizations shows that, by far, the 
greatest proportion of ideas originate with the technical 
people of the Research and Development organization itself . 
When an idea is conceived, some p reliminary, explora-
tory investigation must be pursued to determine feasibility . 
This may take the form of a literature search, a few simple 
experiments, or a theoretical analysis. Since the cost of 
such exploratory investigations is usually quite small 
(consisting mostly of the time of the investigator), it is 
usually not desirable to impose management controls on this 
effort. Moreover, there simply is no means of applying 
controls to it, since this is the step or phase in which the 
information needed later for evaluation is generated. 
Most organizations allow or set aside a certain per-
centage of each investigator's time to perform e xp loratory 
investigations of his own choosing. It is a rather common 
practice in the best Research and Development organiza t i ons 
to set aside approximately ten per cent of a man ' s time for 
this purpose. This is probably the most valuable al l ocation 
of effort that an organization can make, since it i s from 
this effort that ideas originate and germinate. 
The second step in the process is the initiation and 
development of a project proposal. At some point after the 
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origination of an idea and an exploratory investigation~ it 
becomes necessary to devote more resources of time, mate-
rial, and equipment in order to pursue the project further. 
At this point, it is necessary to get something in writing. 
The project proposal comprises a definition of the project 
and pertinent information such as objectives, resource re-
quirements, schedules, state-of-the-art , markets, etc. 
The third step is project selection. At this point, 
management's role begins. This step results in accepting, 
deferring or rejecting a proposal. The proposed outcome is 
compared to the organization's objectives and long-range 
goals. Accepting the proposal means that the organization 
has a current interest in this kind of project; deferral 
means the organization may have a future interest; rejection 
means that it is of no interest. This selection will be 
handled differently by various organizations, but typically 
it is done by a basic research committee, new product com-
mittee, research council, or some high management level. 
It is important here to sound a word of warning . If 
the project is deferred, rejected, or, at a later stage 
cancelled, curtailed, or put into a lower priority, it is 
extremely important to explain the reasons to the origi-
nating investigator. Generally, a great deal of preliminary 
work will have proceeded the submission of the proposal. 
The worker thinks it is practical and feasible or he would 
not have submitted it . Disapproval or cancellation without 
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providing the reasons therefore will convince the investiga-
tor that management is very short-sighted at best. Many 
managers indicate by their actions that they do not have the 
time, or do not need to explain their decisions to subordi-
nates. In dealing with professional people (as the Research 
and Development manager must), nothing is of more importance. 
Time spent in explaining such adverse act ions pays great 
dividends in high morale, better future proposals, and 
greater enthusiasm on the part of the investigators. 
The fourth step is evaluation. This is the point at 
which management must determine the current relative impor-
tance (priority) of a selected project, plus a proposed 
schedule for its accomplishment, and decide what level of 
resources to devote to it. New projects having adequate 
priority are intended to be put into work shortly after 
priority assignment, with some perhaps replacing lower pri-
ority in-work projects. The remaining new projects are 
deferred. 
The fifth step, once a project is in work, is control , 
which is exercised by periodic review. As a result of re-
evaluation, management may decide to add manpower or capital 
to the project, extend the schedule, concept, etc. 
Throughout this process, each project must be consid-
ered in relation to all others. For, with a given capacity 
of manpower and facilities, it is evident that adding a new 
project must be coupled with removing some other project 
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(owing to successful completion or cancellation) or a lower-
ing of emphasis, with a resulting extension of schedules. 
Each of these steps will now be discussed in greater detail. 
The Project Proposal 
The format used should be tailored to the needs of the 
individual organization. The proposal should be as short 
and as complete as possible. A suggested, or typical, for-
mat for such a written proposal is shown in Figure 10. The 
form on which a project proposal is presented should show 
the subject, objectives, technical information, utilization 
information, budget and schedule of of the proposed project. 
The subject should be descriptive of the content of the 
proposed project. The objectives describe not only the ul-
timate results sought, but also any interim results that the 
project seeks to achieve. The technical information is a 
description of the required technology and materials, what 
is needed to obtain them, and what is availableo Another 
way of saying this is that it is a description of the current 
state-of-the-art. The utilization information outlines why 
the project is needed, when it is needed, and what the payoff 
is. The budget is an estimate of the capital, facilities, 
and amount and kind of manpower needed, and when these are 
needed. The schedule is a statement of the expected times 
of completion of the several interim and final objectives. 
The schedule is tied in closely with the budget. 
\ 
PROJECT PROPOSAD FORMAT 
Project Title: -· 




Interim and/or Spin-off Objective(s): 
UTILIZATION INFORMATION 
Need or Justification: 




(personnel Special Unavailable Resources Required: 
skills, materials 9 equipment) 
BUDGET SCHEDULE INFORMATION 
Estimated Cost of Unavailable Resources: 
Total Manpower (in man-months) Required by Labor 
Skill Category: Professional 
Technician 
Number of Persons Required per Month: 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Number of Months to Completion: 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Attach Bar Graph Showing Proposed Schedule by 
:Milestones Assuming Maximum Manpower is 
Availabl e: 




This kind of information is needed on ev e r y propo s a l. 
In some cases, information will be required on paten t a nd 
other legal problems, government regulations, etc. Under 
some circumstances, crash schedules and/or extended sched-
ules also should be prepared for examination and evaluation. 
The information shown is essentially the entire basis 
for selection decisions. For many app l ied research projects, 
the data will be complete in almost all areas, particularly 
in the areas of te c hnical and utilization information. Con-
versely, for many basic research projects, the data will be 
incomplete almost everywhere, with only the technical infor-
mation, an estimate of utilization potential for the area 
considered, and a short-term budget available. In all cases 
it will probably be necessary to update the budgets and 
schedules prior to each review. 
Selection of Projects 
On the basis of the information in t he p roject proposal , 
the appropriate management personnel can s elect the desired 
projects. A typical selection work sheet for a project , in-
corporating the factors considered most important a n d r e le-
vant to the organization's environment is shown in Figure 11. 
Three sets of factors are shown: technical, utilization and 
timing. Subjectively, each of these is important in looking 
ahead to the ultimate payoff of a research project. At this 
state, the evaluatio~ is still subjective, notations for a 
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PROJECT PROPOSAL WORKSHEET 
Project Tit le: Development of Super-Insulation 
Evaluator: John S. Doe ·~------------------
Proposal No.: M-2 Date Evaluated: 2-4-65 
Technical Factors: 
Long term objectives 
Interim objectives 
Technical approach 
Availability of technology 
within organization 
Availability of t echnology 
outside orgatli zation 
Availability of scientific 
skills 
Adequacy of facilities 
Adequacy of support 
manpower 
Tie-in with existing 
projects 
Compared to alternative 
approaches 




Requirement for results 
Funding for i mplementation 
of r esult s 
Reduc t ion of costs of 
operati on 
Increase i n r eli ab i lity 
Value t o cos t ratio 
Effect on operations 
TOTALS 
Timing Factors: 
Completion time relative 
to need 
Reduction in t i me of oper-
ations schedules 



































specific project being simply that a factor is favorable, 
unfavorable, or that the evaluator has no meaningful opinion. 
Each project should be graded by more than one person, 
but care must be exercised that only qu~lified persons are 
used. The scorers must be persons who understand not only 
the technical aspects of the project, but who also have a 
broad, intimate understanding of the organization, its ob-
jectives, and its environment. 
The scoring form shown must be tailored to the individ-
ual organization's area of endeavor and particular techno-
logical problems. It should be developed through careful 
analysis and modified with experience. 
As one guide to provide assistance in the decision of 
whether to accept or reject a proposal, the scores can be 
weighted. A numerical weighting factor might be assigned 
for each of the three sets of factors. For instance, if it 
was decided that each should contribute equally and inde-
pendently to the subjective judgment of the project, a score 
of ten might be assigned to each set of factors. The scores 
for the three factors would be added since they each con-
tribute equally and independently. The unfavorable score 
should be subtracted from the favorable score. The best 
possible score would comprise checks of "favorable" for all 
items. In this case, the best possible score would yield 
+30. The worst possible score would comprise checks of 
"unfavorable" for all items and would yield a weighted 
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score of -30. The "No Opinion" checks should not affect the 
scores of either. 
The calculation of the weighted score for the example 
given in Figure 11 (page 69) would be: 
Favorable 
Technical factors . 7 /11 x 10 = 6. 3 
Utilization factors *3/4 x 10 = 7. 5 
Timing factors 3/3 x 10 = 10 
Sub-Totals 
Unfavorable 
4/11 x 10 = 3.6 
1/4 x 10 = 2.5 
0/3 x 10 = 0 
6.1 
Project value= Favorable - Unfavorable 
= 23.8 - 6.1 = 17.7. 
Thus, after grading each new proposed project, one has 
a ranking of projects with scores ranging between +30 and 
-30. It is emphasized that this scoring and ranking are in-
tended to aid the decision-maker, not to make the decision 
for him. Therefore, it would be unwise to set arbitrary 
limits for acceptance or rejection. 
The actual selection of projects must depend upon man-
agement's evaluation of (a) does the proposed result match 
or meet the long-range goals and plans of the organization, 
(b) is the proposed result the type of product, or informa-
tion, that the organization wishes to market or use, and (c) 
does the possible ultimate payoff justify embarking on the 
*Note that the divisor is 4 instead of 6 because of the 
two items checked "No Opinion." 
project. There are, of course, other considerations~ but 
they are secondary to the above. 
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When management has completed the selection phase, each 
project should have been placed in one of four categories: 
1. Mandatory: These projects are essential for 
the well-being of the organization or to the 
completion of some other high priority 
project. 
2. Acceptable: These are projects which manage-
ment is interested in pursuing. They will be 
worked into the work schedule at the earliest 
possible time in accordance with their 
priorities. 
3. Deferred: These projects look interesting and 
feasible, but are not of immediate interest. 
Reasons for placing projects in this category 
might be (a) high capital investment required, 
(b) would require penetrating new markets, (c) 
would involve getting into overcrowded markets, 
and (d) unavailability of suitable personnel. 
4. Rejected: These projects are of no interest to 
management now or later. Either they do not fit 
in with the long-range goals and plans of the 
organization or the potential payoff does not 
justify the risk and expense of further pursuit. 
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Evaluation of Projects 
Once a project has been selected, it is then further 
evaluated and a priority assigned. In this phase, the proj-
ect must move into competition with existing projects which 
are already being conducted. It is necessary to evaluate 
current projects, as well as the new ones which have been 
accepted. 
For all projects, this evaluation consists of: 
1. Determining the status of the project. 
2. Deciding whether and how to continue. 
3. Assigning a suitable priority. 
The status of a new project is based on the data con-
tained in the selection work sheet. The status of a project 
in work is based on the original information and the amount 
accomplished and learned since the last review. 
Figure 12 shows a form which may prove useful for re-
cording both original and re-evaluated information to aid in 
assigning suitable priorities for applied projects already 
underway. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, it is mandatory that man-
agement insure a balance between projects which are towards 
the basic end of the research spectrum and those towards the 
development end. If basic research projects are forced to 
compete with development projects for priorities, the prior-
ities will go to the development project. This would work 
to the long-range detriment of the organization. It is, 
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therefore, proposed that the basic and applied type programs 
be evaluated separately and not forced to compete with each 
other. 
It is recognized by the author that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to cleanly and unequivocally separate them. 
The ones at either end of the spectrum are easy to identify. 
But, as one approaches the center from either direction, it 
becomes increasingly difficult. It is proposed that manage-
ment subjectively (even arbitrarily) divide the projects 
into two groups for separate evaluation. As a guide, one 
would use for one group the definitions of basic research 
and supporting research as given in Chapter II. For the other 
group, the definitions of applied research and development 
would be used. 
It would be nice if somehow these projects could be 
programmed into a magical computer which would automat-
ically assign the correct numerical priorities. Unfortu-
nately, such a magical computer program does not yet exist 
and educated, experienced, subjective judgment must still be 
relied upon. 
The procedure proposed is one quite familiar to all 
experienced operations research personnel for weighting 
objectives. Both the underlying logic and the procedure are 
simple. The procedure consists fundamentally of a system-
atic check on relative judgments by a process of successive 
comparisons. 
The basic assumptions of the system are: 
1. A person's subjective judgment of the 
relative value between and among proj-
ects is more accurate than his judgment 
of an absolute value of any one project. 
2. A person's relative judgment among a few 
projects is more accurate than his eval-
uation of a large number. 
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The evaluator is asked to make a series of judgments 
among a relatively few projects. Each judgment contributes 
information concerning the relative importance of the pro-
jected outcomes to the evaluator, and each iteration should 
improve the decision. 
Assigning Priorities 
The proposed method of assigning priorities will now 
be described. Although the procedure may, at first, appear 
cumbersome, it is really rather simple in practice. 
The procedure consists of the following steps: 
1. Rank the entire set of projects being 
evaluated in terms of preference or per-
ceived value of the projected outcomes 
without assigning quantitative values. 
2. Select at random one project from the 
set. Let Ps represent the hoped-for 
outcome of this project. 
3. Subdivide the remaining set of projects 
by random assignment into groups of no 
more than five, and preferably into 
groups of approximately equal size. 
Each project (other than P8 ) should be 
included in one and only one group. 
4. Add P8 to each group and assign to it a 
priority value of 1.00, i.e., priority 
of P8 = 1.00. 
5. For each group, tentatively assign to 
each project a value which, initially, 
seems to reflect the relative value of 
their proposed outcomes to that of P8 . 
For example, if the evaluator thought 
that the value of a successful outcome 
for project PA would be twice that of 
P8 , he would assign it a tentative pri-
ority of 2.00. Thus, a group of proj-
ects, PA, PB' P0 , and P8 , might have 
tentatively assigned to them priorities 
of 2.00, 1.25, 0.80, and 1.00, 
respectively. 
6. Make subjective comparisons of combina-
tions such as; 
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Thus, if the evaluator had the choice of 
having a successful outcome of PA or the 
combination of Pc and Ps, which would he 
choose? Suppose he says he would rather 
have Pc and P8 • Then, the values of PA 
and Pc must be adjusted so that PA< Pc + P8 . 
In making adjustments, the value of Ps 
must not be changed. Continue these com-
parisons of combinations until the values 
for each project in the group are consistent 
for all evaluations. 
7. Compare the rankings obtained for the entire 
set of projects as obtained by Steps 2 
through 6 when the groups are recombined 
with that obtained in Step 1. If the rank 
orders differ, reconsider the ranking from 
Step 1 and, if necessary, proceed again 
from Steps 2 through 6 of this procedure. 
8. Once consistent results are obtained, 
normalize the priorities by dividing the 
priority assigned to each project by the 
sum of the priorities assigned to all the 
projects. 
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The result is a relative priority assigned to each proj-
ect in the set and the sum of the priorities equal to one. 
The procedure just described may be clarified by a simple 
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exampleo Suppose there are ten projects: 
1. Suppose these are ranked as follows: P1 , P2 , ..• , 
P10· 
2. Suppose P5 is selected at random as the standard. 
3. The remaining projects are assigned at random to 
three groups 
I II III 
p3 p2 p6 
PlO P9 pl 
P7 P4 Pg 
4. P5 is added to each group and assigned a priority 
equal to 1.00. 
5. Suppose relative priorities are assigned to each 
project and combination comparisons are made until 
consistent evaluations are obtained with the fol-
lowing results: 
I 
P3 = 3.00 
P10 = 0.30 
P? :::: 0.90 
P5 = 1.00 
II 
p2 = 3.25 
P9 = 0.50 
P4 = 2.50 
P5 = 1.00 
III 
p6 = 1.35 
pl= 3.60 
P8 = 0.80 
P5 = 1.00 
6. It will be noted that in the computed rankings of 
Step 5, P5 and P6 are reversed from those assigned 
in Step 1. The evaluator would then reconsider his 
initial rankings. If he decided that P5 was 
indeed more important than P6 , it would be 
necessary to reiterate Steps 2 through 6 
again and make the necessary adjustments to 
the calculated priorities. If, on the other 
hand, after reconsideration, he decided that 
P6 was after all more needed than.P5 , he would 
let the priorities be as adjusted. 
7. Finally, the priorities would be normalized by 
dividing each by 17.20 (the sum of all the 
prior:Lties) to obtain: 
pl = .209 p6 = .078 
p2 = .189 P7 = .052 
p-
3 = .175 Pg = .047 
P4 = .145 P9 = .029 
P5 = .058 plO = .017 
As stated at the beginning of this section, although 
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this procedure at first appears to be rather cumbersome and 
complex, it is really quite simple in practice. It reduces 
the rather complex problem of relative value judgments to 
proportions which can be handled more easily. But, perhaps 
even more important, the multiple-combination comparisons 
force the evaluator to consider his decisions from different 
directions, and against multiple criteria. 
How this procedure would be implemented would vary from 
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organization-to-organization. Priorities could be assigned 
by a single evaluator of high managerial rank or by a com-
mittee or group of evaluators. The important thing is, as 
in the case of the selection phase, that the evaluator or 
evaluators be qualified persons who not only understand the 
technical implications of the projects, but who also have a 
broad, intimate understanding of the organization, its ob-
jectives, its needs and its environment. 
Allocation of Resqurces 
Having developed a methodology for selecting and evalu-
ating projects and assigning a priority to them, one problem 
still remains. Somehow, the available technical manpower 
must be allocated among and within the projects. 
The problem can be expressed mathematically in the fol-
lowing manner. The project number will be denoted by i, 
(i = 1, 2, ••• , m), and it is known that a total of Ri man-
hours must_be applied to project i during a given sequence 
of months to successfully complete the project. For a given 
month j, (j = 1, 2, 3, ... , n), the project planning group 
knows how many total man-hours, A., are available for use by 
J 
the projects active in month j. At least dij man-hours and 
no more than eij man-hours must be expended on project i in 
month j. If X .. is defined as the total number of man-hours 
J.J 
assigned to project i in month j, then the constraints on 
the problem can be expressed as follows: 
n 
1. L xij:::: Ri 
j=l 
m 
2. L x .. <A . 
i=l i J - J 
3. o < d .. < X .. < e . .• 1.J - lJ - 1.J 
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The computational procedure which will be presented here is 
an adaptation of the non-iterative system discussed by Gass 
( 27). 
In the development of a suitable computational proce-
dure for the allocation problem defined, the number and size 
of the problems t o be computed on some regular basis and the 
time which would be required had t o be considered. If the 
scheme proposed by Dantzig (28) were utilized, it appeared 
that to be practical, computer assistance would be required 
i f the number of projects averaged 12 or more. A computa-
tional procedure which would be simple, fast t o apply, fea-
sible for any size Research and Deve l opment organization, 
and coul d be perfor med by hand comput ation, seemed desirable. 
Efforts were, t herefore~ direc t ed towards a nonitera-
tive procedure which woul d be based on a vali d interpret a-
tion of the priority ratings. A simple scheme which would 
yield a feas i ble firs t solution that would also be accept-
able as a final s olution was sought. I t is believed that 
the procedure described be l ow meets t he above requirements. 
It has been tested on a number of actual and devised 
problems and has yielded acceptable answers (with c er tain 
restrictions which will be discussed later) in all cases. 
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To describe the procedure, the data in Table I will be 
employed. Manpower requirements are given in equivalent 
man-months (MM) for ease of computation. The problem could 
also be worked in terms of man-hours. 
TABLE I 
PROBLEM PARAMETERS 
P. c. R. e .. d .. 
J. l l J.J J.J 
Total MM Max MM Min MM 
Project Priority Required Per Month Per Month 
1 0.21 16 2 1 
2 0.16 12 4 1 
3 0.17 8 2 1 
4 0.10 24 5 2 
5 0.09 18 3 1 
Man-months (MM) available per month = 10 
Assuming that a solution for an eight-month time 
period is desired, the computational framework for this 
problem would be as shown in Figure 13. The upper and lower 
bounds are shown in the upper right-hand corner of each cell 
(d .. /e .. ) . The projects are ordered by priority; i.e., 
lJ J.J 
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Project 1 has a higher priority than Project 2, etc. 











A. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
J 
Figure 13. Computational Matrix 
The procedure utilized for the initial allocation 
(Figure 14) is an adaptation of the northwest corner rule. 
An initial allocation (Xij) of the available man-hours is 
determined by starting the allocation with Row 1, Column 1 
and continuing the allocations along the first row until R1 
units have been allocated. The allocation to each month 
should be the maximum number allowed by the upper limit for 
that project. Some adjustment may be necessary in the last 
two months so as to avoid violating the lower bound require-
ment in the last month. 
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pi clan. Mar. June R. 1 
1 2 
1 2 2 2 2 2 16 
1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 
2 4- 12 
1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 l 2 
3 2 8 
2 
4 2 24 
1 
5 18 
Aj 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Allo-
cated 10 10 10 10 . 10 10 8 5 
Figure 14. Initial Allocation 
The initial allocations for the remaining projects are 
then made in the same m~er, one at a time, iri priority 
order, always being sure that the availability restriction 
Aj for each month is not exceeded. The first month's allo-
cation to any project should be the maximum amount allowed 
by the upper bound restrictions for that project, but in no 
case, should it be less than the lower bound restriction. 
If an allocation at least equal to the lower bound restric-
tion -is not possible without violating the Aj restriction, 
then the initial allocation for that project should be de-
ferred until the succeeding month. The allocations proceed 
project-by-project until all of the available resources 
which can be assigned, without violating one of the-
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restrictions, have been utilized. The initial a l l ocations 
for the example problem are shown in Figure 14 (on the pre-
ceding page). 
In general, it would be expected that for some months 
all of the available resources Aj will not have been allo-
cated because of the upper and lower bound restrictions. It 
is then necessary to adjust the allocations in a manner that 
will perhaps stretch out some of the projects, but which 
allows one to assign as much of the available resources as 
possible. This scheme will be illustrated using the same 
(5 x 8) example. 
Starting with Project 1, and proceeding in priority 
order, one looks for the first R. which has not been satis-
1 
fied completely by the allocations. In the example (Figure 
15), this is R5; i.e., for Project 5, 18 man-months are re-
quired, but only 13 have been allocated. One then searches 
the allocations for each month for that project in inverse 
order (i.e., starting with j = n) and find the first month 
in which the allocation is not equal to the maximum con-
straint. In the example, this would be j = 4 where one 
could allocate as much as three man-months, but have actu-
ally allocated only one. 
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P' Jano Feb. ~aro A pro June Aug. R. .Allo--1 . ...! cat ed . 
1 2 l 2 1 2 
1 2 2 2 16 16. 
1 4 1 4 1 4 
2 4 12 12 
1 
3 2 8 8 
2 
4 2 24 24 
1 
5 18 13 • 
A. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
J 
All6-




" .. . 0 = 2 
Figure 15. Adjustment of Allocations 
If one adds a positive allocation e to x54 , then one 
must also subtract it from x44 , and add it to :x;47 to avoid 
violating the restrictions A4 and R4 • Examination of the 
upper and lower constraints of the three affected cells 
shows that the maximum allowable·value for 6 is 2(1 ~ x54 + 
e ~ 3 and x54 = l; therefore, emax = 2; also 2 ~ x47 + e < 5 
and x47 = 3; therefore 9 emax = 2). Therefore, the first 
l 
adjusted tableau is shown in ]figure .l6o This adjustment has· 
allowed the allocation of two more man-months in'the · program.* 
*One would then proceed to the preceding month j =·3 and 
see if some beneficial adjustment was possible. 
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Further examination of the matrix indicates no furt her bene-
ficial adjustments which would not violate any of the 
restrictions. 

















2 2 2 2 2 2 
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2 2 
2 3 5 5 5 
3 3 3 3 3 
10 10 10 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 5 
















EVALUATION OF PROPOSED METHOD 
Analytical Evaluation 
The proposed system can be evaluated for usefulness and 
applicability, first, on the basis of logic and analysis and 
second, on the basis of first-hand experience in application 
in an actual research setting. 
In analyzing the method proposed, it becomes clear im-
mediately that a great deal of subjective judgment is still 
required. This, in the opinion of the writer and others 
closely associated with Research and Development management, 
cannot be avoided. So long as one is dealing with a phenom-
ena with so many unknowns and intangibles as has Research 
and Development, the most reliable criteria for selection 
and evaluation must remain the educated judgment of experi-
enced, competent, research managers. 
The method proposed is neither strictly quanti tative 
nor qualitat i ve in nature. It c an best be descri bed as a 
method for organizing and partially quantifying the qualita-
tive judgments of persons most able to make those judgments. 
The quantification aspects of the method help to organize 
and insure logical evaluation of the qualitative judgments. 
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The method delegates the making of estimates and judg-
ments to those persons in the organization most qualified, 
and in the best position, to make the particular judgments. 
The individual researcher estimates the manpower required 
and the maximum and minimum allocation of resources which 
would be required. He determines also what the hoped-for 
outcome or result will be as well as the current state-of-
the-art. Staff and management personnel who are in a posi-
tion to see the over-all picture, and yet have the requisite 
technical competence, determine how well the proposed out-
come matches the goals and objectives of the organization. 
They serve also as a check on the researcher's evaluation of 
the current state-of-the-art and chances of a successful 
conclusion of the project. Top management, based upon their 
knowledge of the needs and goals of the parent organization, 
assign the priorities and, thus, determine the allocation of 
resources. Thus, each level of the organization performs 
that function for which it is best suited, so far as the 
selection, evaluation, and allocation of resources for the 
Research and Development program are concerned. 
Another strong advantage of the proposed method over 
current methods is its versatility and flexibility. For 
example, in most current quantitative methods it is neces-
sary to express proposed outcomes in terms of some common 
denominator (usually dollars). This restricts their usage 
to comparisons of similar-type projects only. At the pres-
ent time, for example, it is almost impossible to compare 
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the value of a new product development versus a pro~ieet 
which would result in greater reliability of some component 
or product. Most current methods do not provide for the 
evaluation of apples, oranges, and lemons versus each other 
and among themselves. Yet, this is what most research man= 
agers are constantly called upon to do. He has some proj-
ects which will result in new products 1 some that will 
reduce weight or cost 9 others that would result in increased 
reliability,and still others that would result in additional 
prestige .for the organization. The proposed method allows 
him to do this (although admittedly on a subjective basis). 
An additional strong point of the proposed method is 
that it gives appropriate recognition to the importance of 
time in the Research and Development process. It does this 
in two ways. First, the Research and Development manager 
will tend to give a high priority to those projects for 
which the answers are needed soonest and which are the most 
pressing. 
signs the 
Second, the method of allocating resources as-
maximum a.mount possible to the high-priority 
projects to get them completed at the earliest feasible 
date. Any stretch-out of projects is done in the lower 
priority projects where time probably is not so critical. 
A further feature of the proposed method, generally 
overlooked in currently used methods, is a maximum and a 
minimum allocation of resources per time period which is 
practical for each project. Too few resources assigned to 
a program will cause it to be stretched out over such a 
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long time period that the answer wi l l no longer be of much 
value when it is obtained. In addit ion, a project that i s 
undermanned will oftentimes never reall;1 get rolling. Al-
most any project requires a certain amount of concentration 
of effort to get it to II ge l 0' or really II ge t it off the 
ground. " It is usually better ;o not begin a project until 
adequat e support can be given to it; otherwise thos e re-
sources allocated are largely wasted. 
Equally wasteful of resources is the allocation of too 
many resources. The law of diminishing returns often sets 
in rapidly. This is so primar4 l y because most projects re-
quire a high degree of creativity, serendipity, and insight 
for successful completion. Additional resources can speed 
up the data-gathering and testing phases of a project. But, 
even here, t he assimilation and interpretation of the re-
sults on a continuous basis are the pacing activities which 
determine t he effec tiveness of the effort being spent -- and 
this is usually the result of the inputs of one or t wo peo-
ple. The allocation of too many resources to a project can 
result i.n much unneeded and wasted effort. As a matter of 
fact, it can actually result, in some cases, in delaying 
successful conclusion of a project! This can occur from in-
creased administrative burden on the key people as well as 
wasted efforts from being buried under test results and 
data requiring interpretation and assimilation . 
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Test App l ication 
To further evaluate the proposed method , it was tested 
i n four Research and Development organizations. These 
groups were all government organizations engaged in both in-
house and contracted research. Each varied in size , but 
each was carrying on between 15 and 25 active projects at 
the time of the test. In addition, each was supervi sing 
from eight to 20 out side contracts with universities and in-
dustry. Followi ng is a discussion of the results and experi-
ences gained from these tests. 
The first problem encountered was in the use of the 
project selection score sheet (Figure 11, page 69). At 
first, there was considerable divergence in the result s ob-
tained from different scores. Further investigation showed 
it to be a problem of semantics and definitions. When each 
factor and adjective was clearly defined, very close agree-
ment between competent scorers was found. 
The second difficulty occurred in the assignment of 
priorities by the organization managers. No difficulty was 
experienced in t he initial ranking of projects ; however, 
when it was time to assign a quantitative weighting factor 
to these judgments, the problems began. Discussions indi-
cated that the difficulties arose primarily from the unfa-
miliari ty of the manager with the procedure. This was the 
first time that they had tried to quantitatively we i gh the 
value of one project versus another. It is believed that 
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this difficulty would disappear with experi ence , since such 
judgments have always (of necessity) been made, even though 
subconsciously and qualitatively up to this time. 
The final difficulty arose in the allocation of re-
sources phase. Once the priorities were set, and the maxi-
mum and minimum restraints specified, there was no particular 
problem in allocating the manpower by use of the proposed 
method. The problems emerged in translating these alloca-
tions into practical assignments to the available personnel. 
This was attributed primarily to the differences in skills 
and capabilities of the available manpower. 
The method,as proposed, assumes almost complete flexi -
bility in assigning available resources to the various proj -
ects. It completely ignores the wide variations in skill, 
creativity, dedication, and interests which exist between 
different people with supposedly equivalent backgrounds. 
These variations may limit or modify the way in which the 
individual can best be utilized. 
In projects requiring relatively large expenditures of 
manpower (approximately 10 man-months/month or greater) in-
dividual personalities, other than those of the pro j ec t 
leaders, are probably not quite so important. Manpower al-
locations in these larger projects can usually be made dis-
regarding personalities, because the importance of individual 
contributors tends to be masked by the group otuputs. An-
other way of saying this is that the individual skills, 
knowledge, etc., needed will be found more easily in the 
larger group. 
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In the smaller projects, however 1 the importance cf the 
contribution of each participant tends to be more magnified. 
Thus, in an organization whose Research and Development pro-
gram is made up primarily of several relatively small proj-
ects, some adjustments to the allocations will, undoubtedly, 
have to be made. But, this should not present any serious 
problems. In the four trials run, the required modifica-




Because of its increasing magnitude, and its importance 
to everyone, research and development is deserving of seri-
ous study. A great deal of effort has gone into studying 
and defining the process of conduc.t'ing research and develop-
ment, ·but very little effort into the process of managing 
it. 
Most authors who have addressed themselves to the prob-
lem of Research and Development management have dwelled 
mostly on the administrative problems·of budget control; 
selection and training of personnel; design.· and equipping 
the facilities, etc. Most have evaded the very basic imple-
menting decision problems such as the selection of projects 
and allocation of resources to them. 
The author does not propose that the system suggested 
is the full and final answer. A considerable amount of work 
remains to be done. The system suggested does not make the 
decisions. Its only purpose is to provide a logical frame-
work and organization of the pertinent information to aid 
the executive in making his decisions. 
It is hoped that others will consider this area of man-
agement as important and as intriguing as does the author.· 
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Like most research, this study has left unanswered more 
questions than it has satisfied. Among the many problems 
left unresolved are the development of methods to evaluate: 
1. The worth of individual projects to the organ-
ization after they have been successfully 
completed. 
2. The effectiveness of the over-all Research 
and Development effort of the organization. 
3. How large a Research and Development effort 
should be carried on by the parent 
organization. 
4. The effectiveness and worth of individual 
researchers. 
5. The contribution of environmental factors to 
creativity. 
6. How to determine the best combinations of 
available personnel to assign to each project 
taking into consideration the skills, desires 
and personalities of the individuals. 
Chester I. Barnard (29) in his ve+y perceptive paper, 
"Mind in Everyday Affairs" has said that three kinds of con-
siderations govern decision making; material that consists 
of precise information, material of hybrid character, and 
material of a speculative nature. In Research and Develop-
ment management, the executive is usually faced with the 
latter two. 
It has been impossible, therefore, in this study, to 
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come to a complete and irrefutable conclusion~ It is the 
author's desire that the evaluation of these efforts be from 
the viewpoint of ultimate utility. Research that is theo-
retical and fundamental may be of high scientific and intel-
lectual quality, but of little usefulness in contributing to 
the solution of practical problems. There would be little 
excuse for an investigation such as this if it does not have 
ultimate relevance to the solution of operational problems. 
If, therefore, the author has succeeded in shedding some 
light on the true character of the problems and suggested a 
method of approach to solving at least a few of them, this 
investigation has been beneficial. If the author has suc-
ceeded in creating enough interest to persuade ot~ers to 
devote study to this complex, intriguing area of management, 
then it has been a success. 
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